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Abstract
We use Monte Carlo experiments to study how pass-through can improve merger
price predictions, focusing on the first order approximation (FOA) proposed in Jaffe
and Weyl (2013). FOA addresses the functional form misspecification that can exist
in standard merger simulations. We find that the predictions of FOA are tightly dis-
tributed around the true price effects if pass-through is precise, but that measurement
error in pass-through diminishes accuracy. As a comparison to FOA, we also study a
methodology that uses pass-through to select among functional forms for use in simu-
lation. This alternative also increases accuracy relative to standard merger simulation
and proves more robust to measurement error.
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1 Introduction
The profit maximizing level of cost pass-through in many standard oligopoly models depends
on both the first and second derivatives of the consumer demand schedules. This insight
dates back at least to Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983), and is extended and generalized in Weyl
and Fabinger (2013) and Fabinger and Weyl (2015). The more recent literature emphasizes
that pass-through rates can be used to answer important questions in fields such as industrial
organization, international trade, and mechanism design. An emerging empirical literature
uses pass-through to study trade costs (e.g., Atkin and Donaldson (2014)), environmental
regulation (e.g., Fabra and Reguant (2014); Miller, Osborne and Sheu (2015)) and health
insurance (e.g., Cabral, Geruso and Mahoney (2014)).
In this article, we study how pass-through can inform predictions of merger price effects.
One of the central purposes of antitrust analysis is to predict, with reasonable accuracy, the
effects of mergers on prices. This has motivated the development of merger simulation
techniques, which have been the subject of much academic work (e.g., Berry and Pakes
(1993); Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994); Werden and Froeb (1994); Nevo (2000)) and
have been implemented by practitioners at antitrust agencies and in the courtroom (Werden
and Froeb (2008)).1 The methodology relies on functional form assumptions about demand,
under which post-merger equilibrium is computed. It is well established that predictions are
sensitive to these assumptions (e.g. Werden (1996); Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz and Werden
(1999)). Because the functional forms implicitly fix the second order properties of demand,
and because pass-through is driven in part by these second order properties, there is a
theoretical basis for thinking that observed pass-through could ameliorate prediction error
caused by functional form misspecification.
We focus on the theoretical findings of Jaffe and Weyl (2013), that a first order ap-
proximation (FOA) to post-merger prices can be calculated given knowledge of the first and
second derivatives of demand. Provided that elasticities can be estimated or calibrated,
FOA can be implemented by inferring the second derivatives of demand from pass-through.
The first order effects of the merger then are calculated with little reliance on functional
form assumptions.2 Jaffe and Weyl (2013) prove that FOA is precise for arbitrarily small
price changes – here we extend the analysis to mergers with wide-ranging price effects. As
1In merger investigations, simulation often is used to complement other evidence, including documentary
evidence and reduced-form empirical work of the type presented in the Staples/Office Depot trial (Dalkir
and Warren-Boulton (2004)).
2In settings that involve more than two firms, a modified horizontality condition is useful in interpreting
pass-through information. We discuss the details in Section 2.2.
1
a point of comparison for FOA, we also explore a method that we refer to as “informed
simulation,” in which a demand system is selected that elicits pass-through close to what is
observed (Miller, Remer and Sheu (2013)). Simulation then is conducted with the selected
demand system. As we demonstrate in this article, both FOA and informed simulation are
more accurate than “standard” merger simulation in which demand schedules are selected
without regard for pass-through.
Our findings rely on Monte Carlo experiments. We generate a data set comprised of
a large number of markets in which the underlying demand system is either logit, linear,
almost ideal, or log-linear. These four demand systems allow for a wide range of curvature
and pass-through conditions, and are commonly employed in antitrust analyses of mergers
involving differentiated products (Werden, Froeb and Scheffman (2004); Werden and Froeb
(2008)). They have also been used in academic studies that examine the effect of demand
curvature on the precision of counterfactual simulations (e.g., Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz and
Werden (1999); Huang, Rojas and Bass (2008)). We alternately consider scenarios in which
pass-through is observed perfectly, with measurement error, and with systematic bias.
We find that FOA dominates standard merger simulation, provided that pass-through
is observed perfectly and there is some functional form misspecification in the simulation.3
The predictions of FOA are tightly distributed around the true price effects. The median
absolute prediction error (MAPE) that arises with FOA typically is a fraction of the MAPE
with standard merger simulation, and FOA is more accurate in 93% of the merger scenarios
considered. Further, when price effects are evaluated against a specific ten percent threshold,
FOA produces far fewer false positives and false negatives than standard merger simulation.
These results demonstrate that having accurate information on pass-through can greatly
improve the accuracy of counterfactual predictions.
We also find, however, that the accuracy of FOA deteriorates as measurement error in
pass-through is incorporated into the experiments. When pass-through is observed within
90% of its true value, the MAPEs that arises with FOA and standard merger simulation are
of similar magnitudes, and if functional form specification also is minor then simulation tends
to be more accurate than FOA.4 The relative accuracy of FOA is preserved with more modest
3We assume throughout that demand elasticities in the pre-merger equilibrium are known with certainty.
Thus, absent misspecification, simulation generates the post-merger prices exactly. The comparison of FOA
to misspecified merger simulation is informative because the underlying demand schedules in most real-world
markets are unlikely to conform to any of the standard models, so that functional form misspecification is
prevalent in merger simulation.
4An example of a minor functional form misspecification would be a simulation with linear demand when
the true demand system is logit.
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measurement error. Finally, we find that upward bias in pass-through causes FOA to over-
predict price increases, and downward bias leads to under-predictions. This sensitivity arises
because FOA uses pass-through to infer demand curvature, so if pass-through is observed
with error then this feeds directly into the price predictions. Taken together, our results show
that FOA requires precise information on pass-through behavior in order to give accurate
results.
This does not imply that noisy pass-through should be discarded. To the contrary,
we find that informed simulation also outperforms standard merger simulation, and that
it is relatively robust to measurement error in pass-through. While FOA typically is more
accurate than informed simulation when pass-through is observed perfectly, the MAPEs that
arise with informed simulation and FOA are roughly equal when pass-through is observed
within 60% of its true value, and informed simulation is more accurate when pass-through is
observed within 90% of its true value. In each of these scenarios, informed simulation is more
accurate than standard merger simulation. Robustness to measurement error derives from
how pass-through affects the predictions of informed simulation: pass-through has no direct
effect because it is used only to select among demand schedules. This limits the influence
of poorly measured pass-through terms that are difficult to reconcile with economic theory.
The finding suggests that it is appropriate to interpret pass-through through an economic
model if it is observed with significant measurement error.
A number of caveats apply. First, the experimental design limits the accuracy of in-
formed simulation. Given perfect knowledge of pass-through, it is possible to identify the
correct demand system with which to perform simulation, and thereby recover post-merger
prices exactly. We view this as unrealistically optimistic because, in practice, consumer de-
cisions need not align with any of the models used in our experiments. Thus, to implement
informed simulation, we identify the misspecified demand system that produces pass-through
closest to what is observed, and simulate using that demand system. The approach makes
informed simulation less accurate than FOA in the presence of perfect pass-through informa-
tion. The extent to which this extends to practical settings depends on how closely observed
pass-through mimics what can be generated by an economic model. The findings that (i)
informed simulation is more accurate than standard merger simulation and (ii) informed
simulation handles measurement error better than FOA should be more robust.
Additionally, we note that the data generating process used in the Monte Carlo ex-
periments cannot be expected to perfectly reflect the conditions of real-world markets. The
magnitude of prediction error that arises due to functional form misspecification, in par-
ticular, is driven by our reliance on the logit, linear, almost ideal, and log-linear demand
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systems. We nonetheless consider the results to be valuable, as they extend the theoretical
insights of Jaffe and Weyl (2013) beyond arbitrarily small mergers, and they inform how
pass-through can best be used to improve counterfactual predictions. Some of the accuracy
gains we document can be achieved by using the random coefficients logit (RCL) demand
system, which is theoretically flexible enough to match the elasticities and curvature of the
true underlying demand system (e.g., as in Nevo (2000)). Because supply-side variation
often identifies the nonlinear demand parameters, the RCL can be interpreted as another
methodology that allows pass-through to inform predictions.5
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline the theoretical framework in Section
2. The focus is on mergers in differentiated-products Nash-Bertrand models, and we develop
how pass-through can be used to inform prediction following Jaffe and Weyl (2013). Section
3 provides the details of the Monte Carlo experiments. Section 4 presents summary statistics
on pass-through and the merger price effects that arise in the data. Section 5 develops the
results regarding whether and how pass-through can improve counterfactual predictions. In
Section 6, we summarize and sketch some thoughts regarding the difficulties that can arise
in obtaining and interpreting estimates of pass-through.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Merger Price Effects
We examine mergers in the context of a Bertrand-Nash oligopoly model of price competition
among multi-product firms. Mergers change the unilateral pricing calculus of the merging
firms and, provided products are substitutes and countervailing merger efficiencies are small,
result in a new equilibrium characterized by higher prices. Assume that each firm faces a
well-behaved, twice-differentiable demand function. The equilibrium prices of each firm i ∈ I
satisfy the following first order conditions:
fi(P ) ≡ −
[
∂Qi(P )
∂Pi
T
]−1
Qi(P )− Pi +MCi(Qi(P )) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (1)
5In many applications, the flexibility afforded by the RCL is limited due to a sparse representation
of consumer indirect utility (e.g., Nakamura and Zerom (2010); Hellerstein (2008); Miller and Weinberg
(2015)). For example, a specification that incorporates only unobserved heterogeneity in the price coefficient
does not allow the elements of the pass-through matrix to shift independently of one another. Standard
merger simulations employing simpler demand systems, rather than the RCL, tend to be used in antitrust
enforcement due to time constraints and the computational demands of RCL estimation.
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where Pi is a vector of firm i’s prices, Qi(P ) is a vector of firm i’s unit sales, P is a vector
containing the prices of every product, and MCi is the marginal cost function. Consider
a merger between firms j and k that, for simplicity, does not affect the marginal cost and
demand functions. The first order condition changes such that:
hi(P ) ≡ fi(P ) + gi(P ) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (2)
where
gj(P ) = −
(
∂Qj(P )
T
∂Pj
)−1(
∂Qk(P )
T
∂Pj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Matrix of Diversion from j to k
(Pk −MC1k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup of k
(3)
and gk(P ) is defined analogously, while gi(P ) = 0 for all i 6= j, k. The g function is the
product of firm k’s markups and the matrix of diversion ratios between firms j and k,
which depend upon the first derivatives of the demand functions. Equation (3) captures an
opportunity cost created by the merger: each merging firm, when making a sale, possibly
forgoes a sale of its merging partner (Farrell and Shapiro (2010)).6
The prices that satisfy equation (2) depend on how the demand and marginal cost
functions change as prices move away from the pre-merger equilibrium. Nonetheless, the
first order effects of the merger depend only on information that is local to the pre-merger
equilibrium (Jaffe and Weyl (2013)). Specifically, a first order approximation (FOA) to the
price changes that arise from the merger is given by:
∆P = −
(
∂h(P )
∂P
)−1∣∣∣∣∣
P=P 0
g(P 0) (4)
where P 0 is the vector of pre-merger prices. The first order effects therefore depend upon the
opposite inverse Jacobian of h(P ), which Jaffe and Weyl refer to as the merger pass-through
matrix. This matrix incorporates both the first and second derivatives of demand, and can
be conceptualized as the rate at which the change in pricing incentives from the merger
are transmitted to consumers. Therefore, when using equation (2) or (4) to infer the price
changes that arise from a merger, the accuracy of the inference depends on how well the
higher-order properties of real-world demand are captured.
6The g function is referred to in the antitrust literature as upward pricing pressure (UPP).
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2.2 Pass-Through and Prediction
Merger simulation is one methodology in the industrial organization literature used to predict
the price effects from a merger (Nevo and Whinston (2010)). It requires functional forms
for the demand and marginal cost functions to be selected and parameterized, which in
turn allows post-merger prices to be computed as the solution to the post-merger first order
conditions.7 Because the assumed functional forms implicitly restrict the second derivatives
of demand, misspecification bias can arise even if the demand function captures perfectly
the elasticities (i.e. the first derivatives) that arise in the pre-merger equilibrium.8
We explore the extent to which pass-through can be used to inform the second deriva-
tives of demand. Jaffe and Weyl (2013) demonstrate, through an application of the implicit
function theorem, that the cost pass-through matrix in pre-merger equilibrium is given by:
ρ(P )|P=P0 = −
(
∂f(P )
∂P
)−1∣∣∣∣∣
P=P0
(5)
Thus, pass-through equals the opposite inverse of the pre-merger first order conditions, and
it depends directly on both the first and second derivatives of demand. It follows that, given
demand elasticities, equation (5) provides a mapping between pass-through and the second
derivatives. This allows for the second derivatives of demand to be imputed from pass-
through, and used to calculate FOA as proposed in Jaffe and Weyl (2013). Alternatively,
equation (5) can be used to obtain the pass-through rates that arise under different candidate
demand systems. Then, an informed simulation can be conducted using the functional form
of demand that generates pass-through close to the observed pass-through rates (Miller,
Remer and Sheu (2013)).9 Either approach operates to mitigate misspecification error.
Because the number of second derivatives exceeds the number of pass-through terms,
restrictions in addition to equation (5) are needed to identify the full set of second derivatives.
7In practice, elasticities are typically obtained through demand estimation or calibration. A substantial
literature focuses on the conditions under which regression analysis recovers consistent estimates of consumer
substitution (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995); Nevo (2001)). Elasticities alternatively could be
calibrated to match price-cost margins and customer switching patterns, as is more common in merger
enforcement (e.g., Remer and Warren-Boulton (2015)).
8For many common demand systems, the second derivatives are fully determined by the elasticities. This
is the case for the linear, logit, nested logit, almost ideal, and log-linear demand systems. The random
coefficient logit model is theoretically capable of divorcing the first and second derivatives, but in most
applications the specification employed results in only a limited amount of flexibility.
9We define the distance metric that we use to evaluate “closeness” in the next section. Informed simulation
still requires that a menu of candidate demand systems be selected, and the results can depend on which
demand systems are included.
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This is relevant if one is attempting to calculate FOA based on cost pass-through. Slutsky
symmetry is sufficient to identify all second derivatives for duopoly markets. If there are
more than two firms, then second derivatives of the form ∂2Qi/(∂Pj∂Pk), for i 6= j, i 6= k
and j 6= k, remain unidentified without further restrictions. As suggested in Jaffe and Weyl
(2013), the following assumption is sufficient:
∂2Qi
∂Pj∂Pk
=
∂2Qi
∂2Pi
∂Qi
∂Pj
∂Qi
∂Pk(
∂Qi
∂Pi
)2 (i 6= j, i 6= k, j 6= k) (6)
This restriction is exact only if demand adheres to a modified horizontality condition.10
Thus, imputation based on equation (6) itself can introduce misspecification error. However,
because error is only introduced for a limited subset of second derivative terms, one might
expect this to be inconsequential relative to the misspecification error that may arise with
simulation. Indeed, the Monte Carlo evidence we develop indicates that the loss of predictive
accuracy that arises with this imputation tends to be small.11
3 Monte Carlo Experiments
3.1 Overview
In the remainder of the paper, we present numerical evidence on the extent to which cost
pass-through information can improve the accuracy of counterfactual predictions, including
instances in which pass-through is observed with measurement error or bias. All of the
numerical experiments take as given the demand elasticities that arise in the pre-merger
equilibrium. We focus instead on perturbing what is known about demand curvature, as
revealed through pass-through.12
We work with the logit, almost ideal, linear, and log-linear demand systems.13 Because
10The condition, proposed in Jaffe and Weyl (2013), is that Qi(P ) = ψ
(
Pi +
∑
j 6=i µj(Pj)
)
for some
ψ : R → R and µ : R → R. Among the four demand systems considered later in this paper, only linear
demands satisfy the condition precisely.
11In Appendix Figure C.1, we use scatter-plots to compare the predictions of FOA calculated based on
equation (6) to FOA predictions calculated with perfect knowledge of second derivatives. FOA predictions
across the two approaches are nearly identical with logit, almost ideal, and linear demand, and remain
similar with log-linear demand. It follows that imputation under the modified horizontality condition does
not create meaningful misspecification error in our experiments.
12We use the term “demand curvature” interchangeably with second derivatives of demand.
13The four demand systems are commonly employed in academic research and antitrust analyses of mergers
(e.g., Werden, Froeb and Scheffman (2004); Werden and Froeb (2008)); Miller, Remer and Sheu (2013).
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the curvature properties of these systems are fully determined by the elasticities, we can cal-
ibrate them such that the first derivatives are identical across the demand systems in the
pre-merger equilibrium but the curvature (and pass-through) conditions differ. This con-
veys tractability to the data generating process and facilitates comparisons across demand
systems. Given the theoretical relationship between demand curvature and the magnitude
of merger price effects, a reasonable hypothesis is that FOA and informed simulation should
outperform standard merger simulations if the observed pass-through information is of suf-
ficiently high quality. Our experiments largely confirm this hypothesis. Importantly, we
are able to quantify both how much pass-through can improve predictive accuracy and how
quickly improvements diminish as measurement error and bias are introduced to the observed
pass-through rates.
3.2 Data generating process
We generate simulated data that comport with the theoretical assumptions outlined previ-
ously. The markets feature four firms that produce differentiated products with a constant
returns-to-scale production technology. Competition is in prices and equilibrium is Bertrand-
Nash. Each draw of data is independent and characterizes the conditions of a single market,
and the simulated data cover a wide range of competitive conditions that derive from the
randomized draws. We normalize all prices to unity in the pre-merger equilibrium, which
conveys the advantage that merger effects are the same in levels and percentages.14 The
details of the data generating process are as follows:
1. Randomly draw (i) market shares for four firms and an outside good, and (ii) the first
firm’s margin based on a uniform distribution bounded between 0.20 and 0.80.
2. Calibrate the parameters of a logit demand system based on the margin and market
shares, and calculate the demand elasticities that arise in the pre-merger equilibrium.
This entails selecting demand parameters that rationalize the random data. The pa-
rameters are exactly identified given market shares, prices, and a single margin.
3. Calibrate linear, almost ideal, and log-linear demand systems based on the logit de-
mand elasticities. The parameters of these systems are exactly identified given market
shares, prices, and the logit demand elasticities.15
14The loss of generality caused by the price normalization is limited, and we have confirmed that alterna-
tives do not affect results.
15In the pre-merger equilibrium, consumer substitution between products is proportional to market share
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4. Simulate the price effects of a merger between two firms under each of the demand
systems.
5. Repeat steps (1) - (4) until 3,000 draws of data are obtained.
The algorithm generates 12,000 mergers to be examined, each defined by a draw of data
and a demand system.16 As discussed above, the data generating process imposes that pre-
merger demand elasticities are identical across demand systems for a given draw of data.
We provide mathematical details on the calibration process in Appendix A.
The data generating process allows us to isolate the role of demand curvature in driving
merger price effects and to explore cleanly how curvature assumptions matter for simulation.
For instance, consider a merger defined by a given draw of data and the logit demand
system. The true price effect of the merger is obtained from a logit simulation, and this can
be compared against simulation results obtained under alternative assumptions of almost
ideal, linear, and log-linear demand. The existing literature indicates that prediction error
due to functional form misspecification along these lines is substantial (e.g., Crooke, Froeb,
Tschantz and Werden (1999)), and this sensitivity is consistent with the theoretical results
provided in Section 2.
To assess the extent to which pass-through improves predictive accuracy, we posit first
that the cost pass-through matrix is available for use without measurement error or bias.17
We then calculate FOA based on equation (4), using the horizontality restriction of equations
(5) and (6) to impute second derivatives.18
We also evaluate an “informed simulation” in which pass-through is used to select an
appropriate demand system. Given perfect knowledge of pass-through, as posited initially,
and the design of our experiments, it is possible to identify the correct demand system with
because all the systems are calibrated based on logit elasticities. This reduces the dimensionality of the
random data that must be drawn. The substitution-by-share property is retained away from the pre-merger
equilibrium only for logit demand.
16A small number of draws cannot be rationalized with logit demand – this arises if the first firm has both
an unusually small market share and an unusually high price-cost margin. We replace these to obtain the
3,000 draws. The data generating process also produces some markets that exhibit extreme pass-through
conditions, and others with no post-merger equilibria. We exclude those calibrations from the analysis,
treating as extreme a pass-through rate that is negative or exceeds ten. The pass-through criterion eliminates
74 almost ideal markets and 164 log-linear markets. We do not redraw these markets.
17We obtain the pre-merger cost pass-through matrix from equation (5), using second derivatives that are
obtained analytically from the calibrated demand systems (see Miller, Remer and Sheu (2013)).
18To be clear, we use the actual second derivatives to obtain the pass-through matrices. Then we assume
that pass-through, but not the second derivatives, is available for use in prediction. With FOA, the imputed
second derivatives match the actual second derivatives exactly only for the case of linear demand, due to the
misspecification bias that otherwise is introduced by the modified horizontality restriction.
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which to perform prediction. We view this as unrealistically optimistic because, in practice,
consumer decisions need not align with any of the models used in our experiments. It follows
that testing the accuracy of informed simulation should involve the mitigation, but not the
complete elimination, of functional form misspecification. Thus, in our implementation, we
identify the misspecified demand system that produces pass-through that is closest to what
is observed, and simulate using that demand system.19
These results in hand, we next incorporate measurement error and bias into the ob-
served pass-through data, and evaluate how the predictive accuracy of FOA and informed
simulation changes. To add noise, we add a uniformly distributed error to each element of
the pass-through matrix. Mathematically, we define the observed pass-through element (j,k)
to be
ρ˜jk = ρjk +  where  ∼ U(ρjk − tρjk, ρjk + tρjk) (7)
The support of the error is element-specific and depends on t. We use three different levels
for t, such that pass-through is observed alternately within 30, 60, and 90 percent of its true
value. To add bias, we suppose that what is observed for each element (j, k) is ρ˜jk = ρjk(1+s),
where we set s = ±0.15 to reflect some degree of upward or downward bias.20
4 Summary Statistics
In Table 1, we summarize the empirical distributions that arise in the data. The market
shares and margins of firm 1 are obtained from random draws. Because shares are allocated
among the four products and the outside good, the distribution of firm 1’s share is centered
around 20 percent. The margin distribution reflects uniform draws with support over (0.20,
0.80). The own-price elasticity of demand, which equals the inverse margin, has a distri-
bution centered around 2.08, and 90 percent of the elasticities fall between 1.32 and 4.38.
These statistics are invariant to the posited demand system because the demand systems
are calibrated to reproduce the same first-order characteristics in the pre-merger equilibria.
19We use mean squared error as the distance measure. Let ρjk be the (j,k) element of the observed pass-
through matrix, and let ρ̂ijk be the analog for demand system i. The mean squared error for demand system
i is given by MSEi =
∑
j,k(ρjk − ρ̂ijk)2. It is not necessary to observe the full pass-through matrix to
support informed simulation. Indeed, our experiments indicate that prediction error is comparable if instead
industry pass-through is used to select among demand systems.
20Recent research demonstrates that standard orthogonality conditions are insufficient to ensure that
reduced-form regressions of prices on cost shifters yield unbiased estimates of pass-through (MacKay, Miller,
Remer and Sheu (2014)). Bias arises, for example, if pass-through is not constant in prices and the cost
distribution is asymmetric.
10
Table 1: Order Statistics
Median 5%. 10% 25% 75% 90% 95%
Characteristics Invariant to Demand Form
Market share 0.21 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.28 0.35 0.40
Margin 0.48 0.23 0.26 0.34 0.62 0.72 0.76
Elasticity 2.08 1.32 1.38 1.60 2.94 3.91 4.38
Own-Cost Pass-Through
Logit 0.80 0.63 0.67 0.73 0.88 0.94 0.97
AIDS 1.19 0.75 0.78 0.90 1.72 2.36 2.82
Linear 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.57 0.58
Log-Linear 1.87 1.29 1.34 1.50 2.52 3.39 3.98
Cross-Cost Pass-Through
Logit 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.11
AIDS 0.22 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.39 0.70 0.98
Linear 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.17
Log-Linear 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry Pass-Through
Logit 0.95 0.84 0.87 0.91 0.97 0.99 0.99
AIDS 1.90 1.10 1.18 1.39 2.92 4.32 5.27
Linear 0.79 0.67 0.70 0.74 0.87 0.94 0.97
Log-linear 1.87 1.29 1.34 1.50 2.52 3.39 3.98
Merger Price Effects
Logit 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.24 0.30
AIDS 0.18 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.46 1.09 1.88
Linear 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.21 0.28
Log-Linear 0.30 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.77 2.08 4.11
Notes: Summary statistics are based on 3,000 randomly-drawn sets of data
on the pre-merger equilibria. The market share, margin, and elasticity are
for the first firm. Market share and margin are drawn randomly in the
data generating process while the elasticity is the own-price elasticity of
demand and equals the inverse margin. Pass-through is calculated, follow-
ing calibration, based on the curvature properties of the respective demand
systems. Own-cost pass-through is the derivative of firm 1’s equilibrium
price with respect to its own marginal cost. The cross-cost pass-through
statistics are based on the derivative of firm 1’s equilibrium price with re-
spect to firm 2’s marginal cost. The merger price effects are the change in
firm 1’s equilibrium price.
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Cost pass-through depends on demand curvature and varies across the four demand
systems. We define own pass-through as the effect of an individual firm’s costs on its equilib-
rium price. The own pass-through terms fall along the diagonal of the pass-through matrix.
Median own pass-through equals 0.80, 1.19, 0.53, and 1.87 for the logit, almost ideal, lin-
ear and log-linear demand systems, respectively. Own-cost pass-through has wide support
for the almost ideal and log-linear demand systems but is more tightly distributed for the
logit and (especially) the linear demand systems. We define cross pass-through as the effect
of a specific competitor’s cost on an equilibrium price – cross pass-through is isomorphic
to strategic complementarity in prices (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985)). The
cross pass-through terms are the off-diagonal elements of the pass-through matrix. Median
cross pass-through equals 0.04, 0.22, 0.09, and 0.00 across the four demand systems. Thus,
while the almost ideal and log-linear demand systems both tend to generate large own pass-
through, only the AIDS generates large cross pass-through because prices are not strategic
complements (or substitutes) with log-linear demand.
We also report statistics for industry pass-through, which we define as the effect on
equilibrium prices of a cost increase that is experienced by all firms. While knowledge of
industry pass-through alone is insufficient to obtain a FOA to a merger price effect, it can
inform counterfactual prediction in some simpler settings. Further, much of the existing
empirical literature relies on industry-wide cost changes for identification, such as exchange
rate fluctuations (e.g., Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh and Li (2011)), sales taxes (e.g., Barzel
(1976)), and input prices (e.g., Genesove and Mullin (1998)). Our data inform the levels
of industry pass-through that one might expect to estimate with reduced-form techniques,
absent trade costs and other market frictions. As shown, median industry pass-through
equals 0.95, 1.90, 0.79, and 1.87 for the logit, almost ideal, linear, and log-linear demand
systems, respectively. Industry pass-through will always exceed own pass-through if prices
are strategic complements, as is the case for three of our demand systems.
The median merger price effects are 0.09, 0.18, 0.08, and 0.30 for the logit, almost ideal,
linear, and log-linear demand systems, respectively. Because pre-merger prices are normal-
ized to one, these statistics reflects both the median level change and median percentage
change. Dispersion within demand systems mainly reflects the range of upward pricing pres-
sure that arises from the data generating process. Dispersion across demand systems reflects
the specific pass-through properties of the systems, with greater own pass-through associated
with larger price effects. This relationship, first observed in Froeb, Tschantz and Werden
(2005), is explained by the theoretical results of Jaffe and Weyl (2013).
Figure 1 further explores how functional form assumptions affect the predictions of
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Figure 1: Prediction Error from Standard Merger Simulations
Notes: The scatter plots characterize the accuracy of merger simulations when the underlying demand system
is logit (column 1), almost ideal (column 2), linear (column 3), and log-linear (column 4). Merger simulations
are conducted assuming demand is logit (row 1), almost ideal (row 2), linear (row 3), and log-linear (row 4).
Each dot represents the first firm’s predicted and actual post-merger prices for a given draw of data.
simulation. The scatter plots characterize the accuracy of merger simulations when the
underlying demand system is logit (column 1), almost ideal (column 2), linear (column 3),
and log-linear (column 4). Merger simulations are conducted assuming demand is logit (row
1), almost ideal (row 2), linear (row 3), and log-linear (row 4). Each dot represents the
predicted and true changes in firm 1’s price for a given draw of data; its vertical position is
the prediction of simulation and its horizontal position is the true price effect. Dots that fall
along the 45-degree line represent exact predictions while dots that fall above (below) the
line represent over (under) predictions. Prediction error is zero when the functional form
used in simulation matches that of the underlying demand system.21
21Two clarifications may assist in the interpretation of Figure 1. First, the post-merger prices are censored
at 1.25 and, in some instances, the simulated price increases are well above this level. This may lead the
figure to optically understate the degree of prediction error. Appendix Figure C.2 extends the range of
the vertical axis to 1.50 to illustrate. Second, the figure is symmetric by construction. For example, the
scatterplot for logit merger simulation when underlying demand is AIDS is the inverse of the scatterplot for
AIDS merger simulation when underlying demand is logit.
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As shown, logit and linear simulations under-predict the price effects of mergers when
the underlying demand system is almost ideal or log-linear. AIDS simulation over-predicts
price increases when the underlying demand system is logit or linear but under-predicts
when it is log-linear. Log-linear simulation over-predicts price increases in all cases. This
sensitivity of prediction to functional form assumptions is well known (e.g., Crooke, Froeb,
Tschantz and Werden (1999)) and, in antitrust settings, it is standard practice to generate
predictions under multiple different assumptions as a way to evaluate the scope for price
changes. We explore next the extent to which cost pass-through can be used to improve the
precision of merger predictions.
5 Results
5.1 Perfect information on pass-through
Figure 2 provides scatter plots of the prediction error that arises with FOA and informed
simulation, for the cases in which pass-through is observed precisely. As shown, FOA yields
accurate predictions when the underlying demand system is logit or almost ideal, as demon-
strated by the clustering of dots around the 45◦ line. It is exact with linear demand, as it is
in any setting that produces a quadratic profit function. Prediction error is somewhat larger
with the log-linear demand system. Informed simulation provides noisier estimates than
FOA, but the biases are reduced when compared with standard merger simulations. These
results are consistent with expectations: FOA provides high quality predictions when pass-
through is perfectly observed, while (by design) informed simulation only partially mitigates
functional form misspecification.22
Table 2 provides the median absolute prediction errors (MAPEs) generated by the
different methodologies. As shown, the MAPEs of FOA tend to be an order of magnitude
smaller than those of standard simulations, provided there is some functional misspecifica-
tion in the simulation. The improvements in accuracy with informed simulation are more
modest – the MAPEs are close to what arises under the least consequential functional form
misspecification. The similarity exists because informed simulation largely serves to select
among the misspecified demand systems in order to minimize prediction error.
Panel A of Table 3 provides the frequencies with which FOA has smaller absolute
22If, in our setting, one allowed the true underlying demand system to be identified from pass-through,
then informed simulation would predict merger effects with zero prediction error. As discussed above, we
consider this possibility to be unlikely outside our numerical experiments, as there is no reason that consumer
decisions should be expected to conform to any of the standard (tractable) models.
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Figure 2: Prediction Error from FOA and Informed Simulation
Notes: The scatter plots characterize the accuracy of FOA and informed simulation when the underlying
demand system is logit, almost ideal, linear, and log-linear. Each dot represents the first firm’s predicted
and actual post-merger prices for a given draw of data.
Table 2: Median Absolute Prediction Error
Underlying Demand System:
Logit AIDS Linear Log-Linear
FOA 0.002 0.018 0.000 0.101
Informed Simulation 0.020 0.078 0.019 0.133
Logit Simulation 0.000 0.088 0.016 0.207
AIDS Simulation 0.090 0.000 0.103 0.122
Linear Simulation 0.016 0.102 0.000 0.220
Log-Linear Simulation 0.215 0.122 0.228 0.000
Notes: The table provides the median absolute prediction error of
FOA, informed simulation, and standard simulations. Pass-through
is assumed to be observed perfectly.
prediction error (APE) than standard merger simulations. As shown, FOA is more accurate
than standard AIDS, linear and log-linear simulations for 99%, 89% and 100% of the mergers,
respectively, when the underlying demand system is logit. Similarly, high frequencies arise
with the other demand systems. Aggregating across the four demand systems, FOA is more
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Table 3: Frequency that Pass-Through Improves Accuracy
Panel A: First Order Approximation
Underlying Demand System:
Logit AIDS Linear Log-Linear
Logit Simulation · 90.2% 100% 95.3%
AIDS Simulation 99.4% · 100% 53.1%
Linear Simulation 89.2% 92.0% · 93.9%
Log-Linear Simulation 100% 97.7% 100% ·
Panel B: Informed Simulation
Underlying Demand System:
Logit AIDS Linear Log-Linear
Logit Simulation · 88.1% 86.3% 97.8%
AIDS Simulation 94.4% · 98.4% 81.3%
Linear Simulation 80.9% 70.4% · 90.8%
Log-Linear Simulation 100% 92.4% 100% ·
Notes: Panel A shows the fraction of data draws for which FOA has
a smaller absolute prediction error than standard merger simulations
in predicting firm 1’s price change. Panel B shows the same statistic
for informed simulation, but allows for ties.
accurate than standard simulations for 93% of the mergers considered, provided there is
some functional form misspecification. Panel B shows that informed simulation also yields
more accurate predictions for the bulk of mergers when compared to standard simulation.
Ties occur here, by design, because informed simulation is always identical to one of the
misspecified simulations. We report the fraction of mergers for which informed simulation
has an APE that is at least as small as standard merger simulations. Aggregating across the
systems, informed simulation is at least as accurate as the standard merger simulations in
90% of the mergers, provided some misspecification exists, and more accurate in 57% of the
mergers.
One measure of whether these improvements in accuracy are economically meaningful
is whether they would improve enforcement decisions made on the basis of the predicted
price effects. To explore this, we examine the propensity of the prediction methodologies to
produce “false positives” and “false negatives.” We define false positives as price increase
predictions that exceed ten percent when the true effect is less than ten percent. We de-
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Table 4: Type I and II Prediction Error
Panel A: Frequency of False Positives (Type I)
Underlying Demand System:
Logit AIDS Linear Log-Linear
FOA 1.6% 1.5% 0.0% 0.9%
Informed Simulation 6.7% 2.4% 11.3% 0.5%
Logit Simulation · 0.3% 9.6% 0.0%
AIDS Simulation 23.2% · 30.4% 0.0%
Linear Simulation 2.2% 0.0% · 0.0%
Log-Linear Simulation 34.4% 12.6% 41.8% ·
Panel B: Frequency of False Negatives (Type II)
Underlying Demand System:
Logit AIDS Linear Log-Linear
FOA 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 14.5%
Informed Simulation 8.2% 19.0% 1.5% 16.9%
Logit Simulation · 25.0% 2.2% 39.1%
AIDS Simulation 0.2% · 0.0% 13.3%
Linear Simulation 9.6% 32.4% · 46.8%
Log-Linear Simulation 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% ·
Notes: Panel A shows the fraction of data draws for which the true
price change in firm 1’s price is less than 10 percent but the prediction
exceeds 10 percent. Panel B the fraction of data draws for which the
true price change exceeds 10 percent but the prediction is less than
10 percent. FOA is calculated using the pass-through that arises in
the pre-merger equilibrium.
fine false negatives analogously.23 The results are summarized in Table 4. FOA generates
both few false positive and few false negatives, while standard merger simulations yield ei-
ther many false positives or many false negatives, provided there is some misspecification
in functional form. Thus, for example, it is possible to generate conservative predictions
of merger price effects with linear and logit simulations, but if such simulations receive
weight in enforcement decision-making then a nontrivial number of anticompetitive mergers
would proceed. Informed simulation also tends to improve the balance of false positives and
negatives, albeit to a lesser extent than FOA.
23We select a ten percent threshold solely based on the empirical distribution of true prices changes: in
each demand system, many mergers produce true price effects both above and below this threshold. We
have examined other thresholds and the qualitative results are unaffected.
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Figure 3: Absolute Prediction Error for Conditional on the Price Effect
Notes: The panels plot fitted value for absolute prediction error (APE) obtained with nonparametric regres-
sions of APE on the true price effect. The underlying demand system is almost ideal.
We turn now to prediction error conditional on the magnitude of the true merger price
effect. To implement, we regress APE on the price effect using nonparametric techniques, and
examine the obtained fitted values.24 Figure 3 plots the results when the true underlying
demand system is almost ideal (the other demand systems produce qualitatively similar
patterns). We draw two main sets of conclusions. First, while prediction error becomes
larger as the true price effect grows regardless of prediction methodology, this relationship is
much stronger for simulation than for FOA. It is intuitive that the consequences of functional
form misspecification should increase as the counterfactual prices become further from the
initial equilibrium. The results indicate, however, that with FOA the scale of this problem
is much less severe. This suggests that knowledge of pass-through is especially valuable for
understanding counterfactual scenarios that involve large price changes. Second, the relative
accuracy of FOA is maintained even as the true merger price effects become small. We are
unable to identify any range of prices for which standard merger simulation is as accurate
as FOA, provided that pass-through is perfectly observed.
24We use kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions with the standard Epanechnikov kernel.
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Table 5: MAPE with Imperfect Pass-Through Data
Panel A: First Order Approximation
Underlying Demand System:
Logit AIDS Linear Log-Linear
30% Measurement Error 0.013 0.032 0.009 0.102
60% Measurement Error 0.023 0.071 0.019 0.120
90% Measurement Error 0.038 0.118 0.034 0.159
15% Downward Bias 0.015 0.021 0.014 0.142
15% Upward Bias 0.019 0.067 0.015 0.069
Panel B: Informed Simulation
Underlying Demand System:
Logit AIDS Linear Log-Linear
30% Measurement Error 0.020 0.078 0.019 0.131
60% Measurement Error 0.021 0.081 0.019 0.132
90% Measurement Error 0.022 0.088 0.019 0.138
15% Downward Bias 0.016 0.084 0.018 0.134
15% Upward Bias 0.026 0.073 0.020 0.129
Notes: The table shows the median absolute prediction error that arises with (i)
FOA supported by cost pass-through observed within 30%, 60%, and 90% of its true
value; (ii) FOA supported by cost pass-through with 15% downward and upward
biases; and (iii) informed simulation, as defined by the most accurate misspecified
simulation model.
5.2 Measurement error and bias in pass-through
Table 5 shows the MAPEs that arise with FOA and informed simulation when pass-through
is observed with measurement error or bias. The accuracy of FOA deteriorates with the mag-
nitude of measurement error regardless of the underlying demand system. This is consistent
with expectation, as pass-through determines the extent to which the opportunity costs cre-
ated by the merger affect prices, and therefore measurement error affects the accuracy with
which merger pass-through can be recovered. However, even when the pass-through data
are quite noisy, prediction error usually is smaller than what arises under standard merger
simulation, provided that some misspecification exists (see Table 2). The small amount of
bias introduced also increases MAPE in most cases. The effect of bias is more easily seen
graphically, and we return to this shortly.
The accuracy of informed simulation also deteriorates with measurement error in pass-
through, but less quickly relative to FOA. This is because measurement error only rarely
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causes a change in the misspecified model selected for use in the informed simulation. For
example, when underlying demand is logit, the linear demand system is selected for use in
simulation for 74.4% of mergers if there is no measurement error, and for 73.7% of mergers if
pass-through is observed within 90% of its true value. Due to the robustness of this selection
routine, the accuracy of informed simulation exceeds that of FOA when measurement error
in pass-through is large.25 Bias at the level considered also does not affect the selection
routine substantially, and so the MAPE of informed simulation is mostly unaffected.
Figure 4 provides scatter plots of the prediction error with FOA.26 The presence of
measurement error in pass-through leads to a greater spread of FOA predictions, and the
spread increases in the magnitude of the measurement error. Predictions remain centered
around zero, however, so measurement error does not lead to systematic over-prediction or
under-prediction. The predicted price effects of FOA are muted when cost pass-through is
observed with downward bias, and amplified when pass-through is observed with upward
bias. Again this is consistent with the underlying economic theory. Lastly, we note that up-
ward bias in pass-through reduces MAPE for the specific case of log-linear demand precisely
because FOA otherwise understates price effects (e.g., see Figure 2).
Figure 5 provides the same scatter plots for informed simulation. Predictions are not
centered around the true price effects. Nonetheless, the extent is visibly reduced relative
to standard merger simulations (see Figure 1), and the magnitude of measurement error
does not lead to a greater spread of predictions. The presence of bias at the level examined
does not affect much the predictions with informed simulation, again because the selection
routine that chooses the demand model proves to be robust. Robustness to measurement
error derives from how pass-through affects the predictions of informed simulation: pass-
through has no direct effect because it is used only to select among demand schedules. This
limits the influence of poorly measured pass-through terms that are difficult to reconcile
with economic theory. The finding suggests that it is appropriate to interpret pass-through
through an economic model if it is observed with significant measurement error.
25Note that our results are in part dependent on the menu of demand systems we have chosen for our
exercise.
26The figure shows the cases in which cost pass-through is observed within 30% and 90% of its true value.
We omit the case of 60% due to space considerations.
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Figure 4: Prediction Error from FOA with Imperfect Pass-Through Data
Notes: The scatter plots characterize the accuracy of FOA when the underlying demand system is logit,
almost ideal, linear, and log-linear. Each dot represents the first firm’s predicted and actual post-merger
prices for a given draw of data. FOA is calculated based on pass-through observed within 30% and 90% of
its true value (rows 1 and 2), and observed with 15% downward and upward biases (rows 3 and 4).
6 Conclusion
The Monte Carlo experiments that we examine demonstrate that using pass-through to
supplement information on demand elasticities can substantially improve the predictions
of merger price effects. When pass-through is precise, predictions based on the first order
approximation (FOA) of Jaffe and Weyl (2013) are tightly distributed around the true price
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Figure 5: Prediction Error from Informed Simulation with Imperfect Pass-Through Data
Notes: The scatter plots characterize the accuracy of informed simulation when the underlying demand
system is logit, almost ideal, linear, and log-linear. Each dot represents the first firm’s predicted and actual
post-merger prices for a given draw of data. Informed simulation is calculated based on pass-through observed
within 30% and 90% of its true value (rows 1 and 2), and observed with 15% downward and upward biases
(rows 3 and 4).
effects, and avoid the prediction errors that arise in standard merger simulation models due
to functional form misspecification. The predictive accuracy of FOA deteriorates with the
degree of measurement error in pass-through. An alternative to FOA that entails using
pass-through to select among functional forms for use in simulation also increases accuracy
relative to standard merger simulation, and proves more robust to measurement error.
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Because the results broadly suggest a potentially important role for pass-through in
the evaluation of mergers and other counterfactual analyses, we conclude with a brief dis-
cussion about some of the difficulties that can arise in the estimation and interpretation
of pass-through. First, MacKay, Miller, Remer and Sheu (2014) develop that econometric
biases can plague reduced-form linear regressions of prices on cost shifters if pass-through is
non-constant, even if standard orthogonality conditions hold. In such settings, the regression
recovers the average effect of costs on prices, but this need not map into pass-through at any
particular price point. The extent to which average pass-through is useful for counterfactuals
is not established in our experiments here, and could be the focus of additional research. Sec-
ond, menu costs, rule-of-thumb pricing, and nonlinear demand can also frustrate attempts
to estimate pass-through, depending on the variation used to identify regression parameters,
and they may also affect the derived theoretical relationship between local demand curvature
and cost pass-through. Such forces may create a relevant distinction between long run and
short run pass-through rates. This distinction is emphasized in the literature on asymmetric
pass-through (e.g., Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997); Peltzman; (2000)) and increas-
ingly is modeled explicitly (e.g., Nakamura and Zerom (2010); Goldberg and Hellerstein
(2013)), but more research on this subject would be valuable.
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Appendix Materials
A Mathematical Details of the Calibration Process
We provide mathematical details on the calibration process in this appendix. To distinguish
the notation from that of Section 2, we move to lower cases and let, for example, si and pi
be the market share and price of firm i’s product, respectively.27 Recall that in the data
generating process we randomly assign market shares among the four single-product firms
and the outside good, draw the price-cost margin of the first firm’s product from a uniform
distribution with support over (0.2, 0.8), and normalize all prices to unity. The calibration
process then obtains parameters for the logit, almost ideal, linear, and log-linear demand
systems so as to reproduce these draws of data.
Calibration starts with multinomial logit demand, the basic workhorse model of the
discrete choice literature. The system is defined by the share equation
si =
e(δi−αpi)
1 +
∑N
j=1 e
(δj−αpj)
(A.1)
The parameters to be calibrated include the price coefficient α and the product-specific
quality terms δi. We recover the price coefficient by combining the data with the first order
conditions of the first firm. Under the assumption of Nash-Bertrand competition this yields:
α =
1
m1p1(1− s1) (A.2)
wherem1 is the price-cost margin of firm 1. We then identify the quality terms that reproduce
the market shares:
δi = log(si)− log(s0) + αpi (A.3)
for i = 1 . . . N . We follow convention with the normalization δ0 = 0. Occasionally, a set of
randomly-drawn data cannot be rationalized with logit demand, and we replace it with a
set that can be rationalized. This tends to occur when the first firm has both an unusually
small market share and an unusually high price-cost margin.
The logit demand system often is criticized for its inflexible demand elasticities. Here,
the restrictions on substitution are advantageous and allow us to obtain a full matrix of
elasticities with a tractable amount of randomly drawn data. The derivatives of demand
27We define market share si = qi/
∑N
j=1 qj , where qi represents unit sales.
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with respect to prices, as is well known, take the form
∂qi
∂pj
=
{
αsi(1− si) if i = j
−αsisj if i 6= j
(A.4)
We use the logit derivatives to calibrate the more flexible almost ideal, linear, and log-linear
demand systems. This ensures that each demand system has the same first order properties
in the pre-merger equilibrium, for a given draw of data.
The AIDS is written in terms of expenditure shares instead of quantity shares (Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980)). The expenditure share of product i takes the form
wi = αi +
N∑
j=0
γij log pj + βi log(x/P ) (A.5)
where x is total expenditure and P is a price index. We incorporate the outside good
as product i = 0 and normalize its price to one; this reduces to N2 the number of price
coefficients in the system that must be identified (i.e., γij for i, j 6= 0). We further set βi = 0
for all i, a restriction that imposes an income elasticity of unity. Under this restriction, total
expenditures are given by
log(x) = (α˜ + uβ˜) +
N∑
k=1
αk log(pk) +
1
2
N∑
k=1
N∑
j=1
γkj log(pk) log(pj) (A.6)
for some utility u. We identify the sum α˜ + uβ˜ rather than α˜, u, and β˜ individually.28
Given this structure, product i’s unit sales are given by qi = xwi/pi and the first
derivatives of demand take the form
∂qi
∂pj
=
{
x
p2i
(γii − wi + w2i ) if i = j
x
pipj
(γij + wiwj) if i 6= j
(A.7)
The calibration process for the AIDS then takes the following four steps:
1. Calculate x and wi from the randomly drawn data on market shares, using a market
size of one to translate market shares into quantities.
2. Recover the price coefficients γij for i, j 6= 0 that equate the AIDS derivatives given in
28The price index P is defined implicitly by equation (A.6) as the combination of prices that obtains utility
u given expenditure x. A formulation is provided in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
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equation (A.7) and the logit derivatives given in equation (A.4). Symmetry is satisfied
because consumer substitution is proportional to share in the logit model. The outside
good price coefficients, γi0 and γ0i for all i, are not identified and do not affect outcomes
under the normalization the p0 = 1. Nonetheless, they can be conceptualized as taking
values such that the adding up restrictions
∑N
i=0 γij = 0 hold for all j.
3. Recover the expenditure share intercepts αi from equation (A.5), leveraging the nor-
malization that βi = 0. The outside good intercept α0 is not identified and does not
affect outcomes, but can be conceptualized as taking a value such that the adding up
restriction
∑N
i=0 αi = 1 holds.
4. Recover the composite term (α˜ + uβ˜) from equation (A.6).
This process creates an AIDS that, for any given set of data, has quantities and elasticities
that are identical in the pre-merger equilibrium to those that arise under logit demand. The
system possesses all the desirable properties defined in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). Our
approach to calibration differs from Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001), which does not model the
price index as a function of the parameters, and from Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz and Werden
(1999), which assumes total expenditures are fixed.
We turn now to the linear and log-linear demand systems. The first of these takes the
form
qi = αi +
∑
j
βijpj, (A.8)
The parameters to be calibrated include the firm specific intercepts αi and the price coef-
ficients βij. We recover the price coefficients directly from the logit derivatives in equation
(A.4). We then recover the intercepts to equate the implied quantities in equation (A.8)
with the randomly drawn market shares, again using a market size of one. Of similar form
is the log-linear demand system:
log(qi) = γi +
∑
j
ij log pj (A.9)
where the parameters to be calibrated are the intercepts γi and the price coefficients ij.
Again we recover the price coefficients from the logit derivatives (converting first the deriva-
tives into elasticities). We then recover the intercepts to equate the implied quantities with
the market share data. This process creates linear and log-linear demand systems that,
for any given set of data, have quantities and elasticities that are identical to those of the
calibrated logit and almost ideal demand systems, in the pre-merger equilibrium.
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B Derivation of Merger Pass-Through
In this appendix, we provide an expression for the Jacobian of h(P ), which can be used
to construct the merger pass-through matrix as used in Theorem 1. Using the definition
h(P ) ≡ f(P ) + g(P ), we have
∂h(P )
∂P
=
∂f(P )
∂P
+
∂g(P )
∂P
(B.1)
The Jacobian of f(P ) can be written as:
∂f(P )
∂P
=

∂f1(P )
∂p1
. . . ∂f1(P )
∂pN
...
. . .
...
∂fJ (P )
∂p1
. . . ∂fJ (P )
∂pN
 (B.2)
where N is the total number of products and J is the number of firms. The vector P includes
all prices; we use lower case to refer to the prices of individual products, so that pn represents
the price of product n. In the case that product n is sold by firm i,
∂fi(P )
∂pn
= −

0
...
1
0
...

+
[
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [ ∂2Qi
∂Pi∂pn
T
][
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1
Qi −
[
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [∂Qi
∂pn
]
(B.3)
whereQi and Pi are vectors representing the quantities and prices respectively of the products
owned by firm i, and the initial vector of constants has a 1 in the firm-specific index of the
product n. For example, if product 5 is the third product of firm 2, then the 1 will be in
the 3rd index position when calculating ∂f2(P )/∂p5. If product n is not sold by firm i, the
vector of constants is ~0, and thus
∂fi(P )
∂pn
=
[
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [ ∂2Qi
∂Pi∂pn
T
][
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1
Qi −
[
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [∂Qi
∂pn
]
(B.4)
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The matrix ∂g(P )/∂P can be decomposed in a similar manner:
∂g(P )
∂P
=

∂g1(P )
∂p1
. . . ∂g1(P )
∂pN
...
. . .
...
∂gK(P )
∂p1
. . . ∂gK(P )
∂pN
0 . . . 0
↓ ↓

(B.5)
where N is the number of products and K is the number of merging firms. Notice that
∂g(P )/∂P includes zeros for non-merging firms, because the merger does not create oppor-
tunity costs for these firms. In the case that product n is sold by a firm merging with firm
i (this does not include firm i itself),
∂gi(P )
∂pn
= −
[
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [∂Qj
∂Pi
T]

0
...
1
0
...

(B.6)
+
([
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [ ∂2Qi
∂Pi∂pn
T
] [
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [∂Qj
∂Pi
T]
−
[
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [ ∂2Qj
∂Pi∂pn
T
])
(Pj − Cj)
where Qj, Pj, and Cj are vectors of the quantities, prices, and marginal costs respectively of
products sold by firms merging with firm i, and the vector of 1s and 0s has a 1 in the merging
firm’s firm-specific index of the product n. For example, if product 5 is the third product of
firm 2, and firm 2 is merging with firm 1, then the 1 will be in the 3rd index position when
calculating ∂g1(P )/∂p5. It is an important distinction that – supposing there are more than
two merging parties – the index j refers to all of the merging parties’ products, excluding
firm i’s products. If product n is not sold by any firm merging with firm i (including a
product sold by firm i),
∂gi(P )
∂pn
=
([
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [ ∂2Qi
∂Pi∂pn
T
] [
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [∂Qj
∂Pi
T]
−
[
∂Qi
∂Pi
T]−1 [ ∂2Qj
∂Pi∂pn
T
])
(Pj − Cj)
(B.7)
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C Additional Figures
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Figure C.1: FOA under the Modified Horizontality Condition
Notes: The panels plot the predictions of FOA obtained with full knowledge of second derivatives (on the
vertical axis) versus those supported by the modified horizontality condition (on the horizontal axis).
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Figure C.2: Prediction Error with Logit Merger Simulation and Linear Demand
Notes: The figure plots the predictions of logit merger simulation when the true underlying demand system
is linear. Each dot represents the first firm’s predicted and actual post-merger prices for a given draw of
data. The vertical axis is scaled between 1.00 and 1.50.
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